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Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and the
Spread of War
BENJAMIN A. MOST
Brown University
HARVEY STARR
Indiana University
Thediscussionreportsthe resultsof an examinationof thepossiblediffusionof new warparticipations duringthe 1946-65 era. A theoreticalargumentis developedto yield morepreciseexpectations
about when, where,why, and how diffusionprocesssmightoperate.Four diffusion-related
processes
(positivespatialdiffusion,positive reinforcement,negativespatialdiffusion, and negativereinforcement)are discussedand analyzed.A seriesof simpleturnovertablesand afocus on nations'borders
are used to go beyond the authors'previousstochasticmodelingefforts. Theresultsprovidestrong
evidencethat is consistentwith both the authors'theoreticalargumentand the generalwardiffusion
hypothesis.Theanalysesseem to indicatethatcertaintypesof warsmayindeedhavetendedto diffuse
acrossspacefrom one nation to anotherbetween1946 and 1965.

The notion that an event may alter the probability of subsequent events through diffusion or
contagion processes is not new. The work of
scholars on a variety of topics suggests that wars
may also diffuse.' As Rapoport (1960) observes,

Support for this research has been provided by the
Center for International Policy Studies, Indiana University, under Grant 750-9514 from the Ford Foundation,
and from an Indiana University Grant-in-Aid of Faculty
Research. While a number of colleagues have been helpful to us in this research, the authors would like to extend a special word of gratitude to the late John V. Gillespie. His support, advice, ideas and criticisms were invaluable.
'Scholars such as Naroll (1961, 1965, 1973), Lieberson and Silverman (1965), Walker (1969), Spilerman
(1970), Midlarsky (1970, 1974a, 1978), Gillespie (1970),
Gray (1973), Job (1973), Most (1973), Collier and Messick (1975), Li and Thompson (1975), Siverson and
Duncan (1976), Ross and Homer (1976), Eyestone
(1977) and others have examined the diffusion of phenomenon such as race riots, coups and other types of
domestic violence, alliance behaviors and policy innovations. The possibility that wars may similarly diffuse is
suggested in research on the cyclical patterns in the
onset of war and the amount of war that is underway in
the system at any given point in time (Moyal, 1949;
Wright, 1965; Denton, 1966; Denton and Phillips, 1968;
and Singer and Small, 1972), the linkages between the
international environment and foreign policy (Rosenau,
1969, 1971; Wilkenfeld, 1973), the impact of external
conditions on violence within nations (Stohl, 1975), the
relationship between domestic violence and foreign
policy actions (Wilkenfeld, 1968, 1969, 1972) and research on arms races (Richardson, 1960a; North, Brody
and Holsti, 1964: Zinnes, 1976; and Alcock, 1972).
1972).
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internationalconflicts may spread from one nation to anotherin patternsthat aresimilarto those
followed by contagiousdiseases.Participationin
warat one point in time may affect the likelihood
of subsequent war participations.The French
retreat from Indochina, the Middle East and
Africa as one after anotherof its colonialpossessions eruptedin warsof independencemaybe one
example of such a process. The involvementof
South Africa in Angola and the interventionof
both Israeland Syria in the LebaneseCivil War
may be others.
Most of the analysesof the causesof war have
ignored the theoretical and empirical evidence
that at least some wars have significantconsequences for subsequentconflicts. Only a small
numberof analystshave focused on the war diffusion possibility,and such work has failedto do
more than scratchthe surfaceof the problem.2
2See, for example, Richardson (1960a, 1960b), Singer
and Small (1974), Starr and Most (1976), Davis, Duncan
and Siverson (1976, 1978), and Yamamoto and Bremer
(1976). Richardson (1960b) investigated whether or not
wars occurred randomly through time. Singer and Small
(1974) probed whether the acceptance of war leads to
more war, but their analysis focused on reinforcement
patterns within nations rather than on diffusion from
one nation to another. Siverson and Duncan (1977) used
fairly sophisticated stochastic models to examine diffusion/reinforcement processes as they affected the temporal clusters of warring dyads drawn exclusively from
the international wars included in the Correlates of War
data set. These studies are similar to this article and our
own earlier war diffusion research, but they are also sufficiently distinct from our work that comparative evaluations are precluded. Differences in the data sets used.
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That all four of these processes are related to
the general war diffusion hypothesis should be
The generalwar diffusion hypothesisconcerns clear. In each, a war experience at one point in
the possibilitythat the occurrenceof one new war time affects the probability of subsequent conparticipationwill alter the probabilityof subse- flicts. Positive reinforcement (see path A in Figure
quent occurrences.It is helpful, however,to dis- 1) is a within-nation, temporal diffusion process.
aggregatethis generalhypothesisin orderto dis- It is an historical possibility: A nation's decision
tinguishthe four followingdiffusion-relatedpro- to go to war at some time increases the probability
that it will make a similar decision at some subsecesses:
quent time. Positive spatial diffusion (path B in
Positive Reinforcement:The processin which Figure 1) more directly entails the transfer of one
the occurrenceof a new warparticipationin a nation's war behavior to other nations. The two
nation increasesthe likelihood that the same remaining possibilities-negative reinforcement
nation will experiencesubsequentwar partici- (path C) and negative spatial diffusion (path D)pations;
are somewhat more difficult to deal with because
NegativeReinforcement:The processin which the researcher is placed in the awkward position
the occurrenceof a new war participationin a of trying to analyze "events" that do not occur. It
nation decreasesthe likelihoodthat the same is, nevertheless, entirely plausible that such pronation will experiencesubsequentwar partici- cesses operate. Just as the toppling of the Allende
government in Chile at least temporarily led Latin
pations;
Americans in other nations to forestall coup efPositive Spatial Diffusion: The process in forts of their own, a nation's own war experiences
which the occurrenceof a new war participa- or its interpretation of the war experiences of
tion in a nation increasesthe likelihood that others may discourage a nation from going to
other nations will experiencesubsequentwar war.

The Argument

participations;and,
Negative Spatial Diffusion: The process in
Intra-Nation Reinforcement Processes
which the occurrenceof a new war participation in a nation decreasesthe likelihoodthat
Some initial assumptions can be made about
other nations will experiencesubsequentwar the possible linkages between a nation's own war
participations.
experiences at one time and some subsequent
time:
1. The decision makers in any nation are confronted by an "operational milieu" (Sprout
and Sprout, 1965, p. 30) that comprises the
risks and opportunities that effectively impinge
on the nation in question;

in the units of analysis examined, in the ways in which
distinct phenomena are hypothesized to diffuse, and in
basic questions and methodologies indicate that there is
very little overlap with our discussion.

xito

A. Positive Reinforcement

B. Poitv Saga
Diffusion

Ito

> Xit2

Xit,

egtve Spatial
\/Diffusion

It 1

C. Negative Reinforcement

Source: Prepared by the authors.
Key: X = War behavior of nations i and j, respectively, at times to, tj, and t2.
Figure 1. Diffusion-Related Processes

Xit2

934

The American Political Science Review

2. The operational milieu (and hence, -the perceived risks and opportunities) may change
through time, and such changes may induce
decision makers to reassess their situations;
3. If decision makers are to protect themselves
from the risks or avail themselves of the opportunities they perceive in their environment,
they must possess both the capacity and the
willingness to do so (Starr, 1978); and,
4. Just as changes in decision makers' operational
milieus may alter their perceptions of the risks
and opportunities, changes in the perceived environment may also result in changes in decision makers' willingness to undertake particular policies in response to the risks and opportunities confronting them.
The importance of these assumptions can be
demonstrated by considering Boulding's "theory
of viability" (1962, Ch. 4). Focusing on zones in
which a nation is dominant ("unconditionally viable") and dominated ("conditionally viable"),
Boulding argues that a nation will increase its defense expenditures in an effort to expand the first
area and contract the second. Decisions to arm or
disarm at one time thus have some effect on a nation's zones of unconditional and conditional viability at some later time.
The point to be noted, of course, is that an armaments decision is only one factor that may alter
a nation's zones of unconditional and conditional
viability, and hence, its decision makers' perceptions of risks and opportunities. Similar linkages
can be posited to relate a nation's recent and future war behavior. Regardless of whether a nation
wins or loses an initial conflict, the conflict may
have some impact on that nation's viability zones.
The fighting should induce the leaders of a warring (or a recently warring) nation to reassess
risks, opportunities, and policy options. This reevaluation may alter the probability that the nation will soon take up arms again.
Losing a war, for example, may shift a nation
from being unconditionally viable at its home to
being only conditionally viable and may result in
positive reinforcement. A defeat may frustrate a
nation's leaders and encourage them to avenge the
loss, recoup national pride, recover lost territory,
and so on by waging a subsequent conflict (e.g.,
Germany's reaction to World War I and the Arab
nations' reaction to successive Israeli victories in
the Middle East). The shift from unconditional to
conditional viability could also produce a negative
reinforcement effect. An initial loss might decrease the likelihood of subsequent wars by reducing a nation's fighting capacity, increasing the nation's fear of war, or persuading leaders of the futility of the war option (e.g., Japan since World
War II).
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A victory which shifts a nation from being conditionally viable at its home to being unconditionally viable could produce similar results. In a process of positive reinforcement, success may embolden a nation's leaders-see Blainey's (1973)
notions of "confidence" and "optimism"-and
thereby stimulate their entry into subsequent conflicts (e.g., Hitler at the outset of World War II or
the Vietnamese and their decision to attack Kampuchea). Alternatively, an initial victory may produce negative reinforcement and decrease the likelihood of subsequent wars if leaders are satiated
or the nation's dominance over some territory is
secured (e.g., wars of colonial conquest and national expansion or integration).
These scenarios could be extended, of course.
The Vietnam defeat clearly did not shift the
United States from a state of unconditional to
conditional viability at its home, for example.
Nevertheless, that conflict may have had a negative reinforcement effect insofar as it apparently
induced the U.S. to forego subsequent overt war
participations in Angola and Ethiopia. Despite
the relative simplicity of these scenarios, however,
their point should be clear: Just as a nation's decision to arm at one point in time may affect that
nation's risks and opportunities and hence its armaments decisions at some subsequent time,
fighting a war may have similar impacts. Because a war at one time will alter the risks, opportunities, and policy options facing decision
makers, the likelihood that they will decide to become involved in another conflict may also be
shifted.
Inter-Nation Spatial Diffusion Processes
The possible operation of intra-nation reinforcement processes seems clear in comparison
with inter-nation spatial diffusion effects. Even if
a war participation by one nation alters the probability that other nations will become involved in
wars, it seems unreasonable to expect that a new
war participation by Cambodia, for example,
would have more than a negligible impact on Bolivia's decision calculus. At a minimum, it seems
more reasonable to hypothesize that if wars tend
to diffuse, the process is most likely to operate
among those nations that share high levels of interaction. In other words, it is plausible that spatial diffusion processes exist, but they may operate only within those groups of nations that interact most strongly rather than at the global level.
The difficulty, of course, is that nations interact
with each other in different ways. Nevertheless,
simple geographic proximity seems to constitute a
very basic and at least initially useful basis for
identifying those groups of interacting nations
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within which diffusion processes are most likely.
The importance of geographic proximity in determining the amount of interaction between nations
and how it may create awareness, risks and opportunities have been discussed extensively by Zipf
(1949), Richardson (1960a, p. 176), Gleditsch
(1969), Gleditsch and Singer (1970), Weede (1970,
1973, 1975), Cobb and Elder (1970, p. 89), Pearson (1974), Starr (1975), and Garnham (1976).
Nations that are "close" to one another in terms
of distance are likely to interact and perceive each
other's conditions and behaviors as important.
Simple distance-and especially the commonly
used distance between nation's capitals-may not
be the most useful indicator of the interaction/
proximity concepts, however. As we have argued
elsewhere (Most and Starr, 1975, 1976), it seems
preferable to operationalize the concepts on the
basis of shared borders. Nations possess both
non-colonial frontiers (those that exist directly between nations) and colonial borders (those that
exist indirectly between nations as a result of their
colonies or territorial possessions). Simple distance measures and non-colonial borders seem
roughly analogous. What the distance operationalization overlooks, however, is the possibility
that even distant nations may interact with one
another as a result of their colonial or territorial
extensions. More important, a nation that borders
on a large number of other nations is faced with a
potentially high risk that it may be threatened or
attacked by at least some of its neighbors. At the
same time, of course, nations bordering on many
other nations are provided with numerous opportunities for launching attacks of their own (Starr,
1978).
Two of the existing treatments of geographic
proximity (as measured either by "short" distance
or shared borders) are worthy of note. The first is
Boulding's above-mentioned theory of viability
(1962, Ch. 4). Boulding argues that the "power"
of some entity is greatest at home and that the increases in the cost and time necessary to transport
that power cause it to diminish along a "loss of
strength gradient" (LSG) as the distance from
home is increased. Each nation possesses some
home strength in Boulding's formulation, and
that strength is affected by the LSG. Hence, the
LSGs of different nations overlap, thereby creating the zones of unconditional and conditional
viability.
Arms races develop in Boulding's formulation
because a nation that is unsatisfied either with the
area in which it is dominant (its "sphere of influence") or with the area in which it is dominated
begins to increase its home strength by arming.
This will expand that nation's zone of unconditional viability, but at the same time it will expand
the area in which neighboring nations are condi-
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tionally viable. In response, those proximate nations may also begin to arm in order to reduce
their areas of uncertainty and risk. In contrast,
distant nations would be less likely to perceive a
threat in increasing armaments because any increases would be offset or reduced by distance.
According to Boulding's key tenet, "the further
the weaker," one would expect that proximate nations would be perceived as more threatening than
distant ones. Nations possessing many neighbors
are given many targets or opportunities to use
their power without being greatly affected by distance. At the same time, however, such nations
are confronted with great risks and uncertainty
because they must protect and defend themselves
against many potential opponents. Nations with
many close neighbors thus might seek to reduce
their uncertainty by arming, by forming alliances,
or by going to war.
Midlarsky's investigation (1974b, 1975) of the
role of uncertainty in the occurrence of war brings
one to a similar conclusion by an alternative
route. In a variation of the frustration-aggression
theory of violence (1975, pp. 37-38), Midlarsky
argues that nations desire to reduce uncertainty,
but they may be constrained from doing so even
when they have the necessary capabilities. Political violence is more probable when such a nation
is constrained and uncertainty not only cannot be
reduced but actually grows. As Midlarsky and
others hypothesize, more bordering nations may
create more uncertainty by reducing control over
the environment and nations may go to war to reduce uncertainty.
One should be extremely cautious in considering the relationship between borders and uncertainty. More borders may indeed contribute to increased interaction among nations, more opportunities for possible attack, greater risks of attack,
and heightened levels of uncertainty, but it is unlikely that borders cause wars in a deterministic
sense. It is more plausible to expect that they may
-probably in combination with other factorscreate structures of risks and opportunities that
constrain the range of possible inter-nation interactions and make certain types of conflictual behavior more or less likely.
The important point, however, is that each nation's structure of risks and opportunities is likely
to be changed once a war is under way and these
changes may be most dramatic for those nations
which are proximate to the warring nations. Two
nations may wage a war to reduce their own uncertainty, but the fact that they are reallocating
and expending some of their "power" in the

3For a more formal summary of Boulding's thesis by
two geographers, see Cox and Agnew (1974).
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fighting may alter their immediate neighbors' uncertainty, LSGs and zones of conditional and unconditional viability. For example, if a nation
shifts from conditional to unconditional viability
as a result of a war between other nations, it may
join the conflict or initiate a war of its own in a
process of positive spatial diffusion. Negative spatial diffusion might also develop in such a situation. Nations which would have gone to war in the
prewar period may no longer need to do so if a
war is initiated by other nations.

Recapitulation
In summary, we have the beginnings of an argument that may explain when, where, why, and
how new war participations at one point in time
may alter the likelihood of subsequent occurrences in either the same (reinforcement) or different (spatial diffusion) nations. The thesis is not
deterministic. Factors affecting decision makers'
willingness to avail themselves of opportunities
are omitted. Other factors that might also be related to war reinforcement and spatial diffusion
patterns are not included.
While the linkages are neither complete nor
fully specified, the basic outlines of the argument
should be apparent. As Boulding and Midlarsky
suggest, borders do not cause wars but the more
borders a nation has,
1. the greater the number of risks and opportunities that confront that nation;
2. the greater the likelihood that that nation or its
colonial or extra-territorial extensions will be
only conditionally viable; and
3. the greater the level of that nation's uncertainty.
If nations are conditionally viable or have high
levels of uncertainty, they should have a high likelihood of:
4. arming and becoming involved in arms races;
and
5. going to war.
Regardless of why a "first war" is begun, however, that initial conflict may change the world for
its participants and their immediate neighbors.
The warring (or recently warring) nations and the
countries bordering them may find themselves
confronted with changed levels of uncertainty and
altered viability zones. Depending on the nature
of those changes and on the willingness of the decision makers in each nation to avail themselves of
the risks and opportunities presented by the altered situation, the shifts in levels of uncertainty
and viability zones may induce these nations to:
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6. participate in wars that they had no intention
of waging in the prewar context; or
7. forego their participation in wars that they had
intended to fight before the first conflict
began.
Recent events in Indochina may exemplify at
least some of these effects. Having fought and
eventually won wars against France and the U.S.,
the Vietnamese may have been encouraged or emboldened-in what we call a reinforcement process-to attack Kampuchea. The effects of that
war may have altered Chinese perceptions and
been instrumental in inducing them-in a spatial
diffusion process-to launch their own attack
against Vietnam.
While the empirical evidence and a new theoretical rationale seem suficient for investigating
the war diffusion possibility, a new attack on the
problem is buttressed by a second set of considerations. Most analyses of the causes of war have ignored the diffusion/reinforcement possibility and
assumed that each occurrence of war was independent of all other occurrences. Such an omission may be significant. If strong diffusion/reinforcement processes undermined the validity of
the standard parametric statistical assumption of
the independence of observations and such processes went unrecognized, then spurious correlations may have been obtained between systemic
variables or national attributes, for example, and
the amount of war (Naroll, 1965). The results of
correlation and ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression analyses may have been misinterpreted.
The standard tests of significance may have been
invalid. The sampling variances of the estimates
may have been underestimated. The predictions
obtained from OLS regressions may have been inefficient (Johnston, 1972, p. 246). Simply, the
development of theories about the causes of war
may have been impeded as a result of strong (but
unrecognized) diffusion/reinforcement processes.
Wrong decisions may have been made about
which variables to retain and which to exclude
from subsequent analysis.
For these theoretical and methodological reasons, a more thorough investigation of the diffusionlreinforcement argument seems warranted.
The initial efforts to test certain aspects of that
formulation are presented below.
The Analyses
Preliminary Findings. In a series of earlier studies,
two stochastic models-a simple Poisson model
of random or independent occurrences and a
Modified Poisson with diffusion model-were
used to focus on the possibility that reinforcement
or spatial diffusion processes influenced nations'
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participations in wars between 1946 and 1965 mutually independent during the 1946-65 period.
(Most and Starr, 1976, 1977). Following a ration- If the argument was not verified, it was not reale for a comparative focus on three sets of war jected either. Further examination of the diffudata and a discussion of the various advantages of sion possibility seemed warranted.
The new analyses reported here are not meant
each (Most and Starr, 1976), we drew data from:
the Correlates of War (COW) project (Singer and as an exhaustive test of the theoretical formulaSmall, 1972, Ch. 2); a combined Wright and Rich- tion; they simply focus on the more important
ardson (WR) list as presented by Singer and Small facets of that argument. Once again taking a na(1972, Ch. 5); and the list of 53 wars reported in tion's new war participations during the 1946-65
SIPRI (1970, Table 4A. 1) for which there was at period as the objects of the analysis (as reported
least some reported Richardson magnitude of by the COW, WR, and SIPRI lists) the new studeadliness.
dies abandon the use of stochastic models and use
The conclusions drawn from those analyses two much simpler sets of procedures.
were fairly straightforward. Application of the
Poisson/Modified Poisson procedures to the
COW new war participations during the 1946-65
period yielded no evidence that such events had
tended to diffuse. When identical procedures were
applied to the SIPRI new war participations, howA. Numberof New WarParticipationsat t1
ever, the evidence was consistent with the proposi0
1
2
>3
tion that such occurrences had tended to diffuse
and that the nations that existed as of 1945 had
had heterogeneous propensities to engage in such
b
d
a
0
C
conflicts. Finally, tests on the WR data failed to CU
provide clear conclusions either for or against the
e
f
h
1
g
diffusion possibility.
These findings were intriguing, if not entirely
conclusive. That such divergent results could be
i
2
Y
k
obtained from different, commonly used data sets
had clear implications for scholars interested in
the causes of war. The time may have come to de- "3
o
m
>3
n
p
velop a consensus about just what constitutes
such a conflict. Even though the three war data z
sets overlap to a certain extent and thereby preB. Numberof New WarParticipationsat tl
clude any firm conclusions, the preliminary
analyses provided some support for the conten0
2
1
>3
tions that different types of war may exist and
that the dominant type of war may have changed CU
0 CR/NS
PS
PS
PS
through time (Kende, 1971; Starr, 1976). Even
.C.
..
when allowances were made for the differences in
the nations' rates of proneness to events, pre1 NR/NS
CR
PS/PR PS/PR
liminary studies suggested that different types of
4-A
conflicts may have had different propensities to
diffuse.' The most important result from the pilot
2 NR/NS NR/NS
CR
PS/PR
analyses, however, was that the diffusion problem 0
could not be simply ignored. The theoretical argu>3 NR/NS NS/NR NS/NR
CR
ment was clearly not confirmed, but it was also
quite clear that-under certain conditions-at
least some war participations might not have been

4Theevidenceis only preliminary,but it appearsat
this stage that large-scaleinterstatewars such as those
tappedby the COW list did not tend to spreadduring
the interval.In contrast,the evidenceis consistentwith
the hypothesisthat small-scale,guerrillaand colonial
conflicts (such as those that dominatethe SIPRI list)
may have diffusedquitereadily.This is merelya working hypothesis,however.

Source: Preparedby the authors.
Key: CR = ConstantRate
PS = PositiveSpatialDiffusion
PR = PositiveReinforcement
NS = NegativeSpatialDiffusion
NR = NegativeReinforcement
Figure2. TurnoverTables:ExpectedPatternsunder
the FourDiffusion/ReinforcementHypotheses
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The Turnover Tables. Potentially valuable insights on the diffusion problemcan be obtained
by consideringsimpleturnovertablesor transition
matrices(see Figure2A). If a nation had no war
experiencein some intervaland none in a second
period,it would fall into cell "a." If a nationhad
two occurrencesin the firstperiodand none in the
second, it would fall into cell "i," and so on.
Using tables of this sort make it possibleto develop expectationsabout where nations "should
have fallen if" one or another of the four processeswas operating.(A numberof theseexpectations, developed originally in Most (1973) and
Most and Starr(1975, 1976),are shownin Figure
2B and Table 1). There is some convergencein
these expectations,of course, makingit impossible to distinguishcompletelybetweenpositivereinforcementand positive spatial diffusion. Similar problemswill be encounteredin handlingthe
two negativealternatives.Even with these overlaps, however, the expectationsare sufficiently
distinct to permit at least a modest step toward
distinguishingamong the four processes.
The applicationof theseproceduresbeginswith
a comparisonof new war participationexperiences between ten- and five-yearperiods: 1946-55
versus 1956-65, and 1956-60 versus 1961-65 (see
Figures3 and 4). (Figure3 concernsonly those nations that Singerand Small(1972)classedas members of the internationalsystemduringthe entire
1946-65 interval. Figure 4 considers only those
nations that were systemmembersduringthe entire 1956-65period.)
The resultsof these simpleturnoverprocedures
are summarizedin Table 2. Regardingthe comparisonof the two ten-yearperiods(1946-55 versus 1956-65), it is immediatelyapparentthat the
expectationsfor positive reinforcementand positive spatialdiffusion are generallynot satisfiedin
any of the threedatasets. Almostno signsof positive reinforcementappear,and thereis only weak
evidenceof positive spatialdiffusion. The results
obtainedfor the second positivespatialdiffusion
expectationshouldnot be completelyoverlooked,
however.Threepoints shouldbe noted. First,the
nations that are includedin this set of ratios fall
preciselyin the areasin whichthe positivespatial
diffusion and positive reinforcementarguments
do not overlap(see Figure2B). Of the two positive possibilities, only positive spatial diffusion
can account for the patternsobserved. Second,
these ratiosare low-4.2 percent(2 of 47) for the
COW data, 13.6 percent (6 or 44) for the WR
data, and 22.0 percent(9 of 41 for SIPRI-and
quite clearlydo not stronglysupportthe conclusion that at leastthe SIPRInewwarparticipations
tendedto diffuse from one nationto anotherduring the 1946-65period.Nevertheless,the progression fromCOWto WR to SIPRIin the magnitude

of these ratios does once again suggest that SIPRI
(rather than COW) new war participations were
more-likely to diffuse.
It should be emphasized, however, that neither
the positive spatial diffusion nor the positive reinforcement arguments provide an accurate description of the overall patterns observed in the turnover tables. It is difficult to determine whether
negative spatial diffusion or negative reinforcement provides a better accounting for those patterns, although the negative spatial diffusion possibility appears more likely. Leaving that consideration aside, however, the important point is
that the Poisson/Modified Poisson procedures
failed to tap such negative tendencies. This analysis indicates that nations that were at peace generally tended to remain at peace. Nations that
were at war in one period may have had higher
rates of proneness to subsequent new war participations, but they appear to have followed some
natural "regression" toward (if not actually to)

COW:

o
O 45
1946--55 1 15
2
3

1
2
2

1946-55

0 '38
1 14
2
2
3
4

1
6
2
1

1956-63
3
2

4

5

4

5

1
1
1

51
SIPRI:

o
1946-55

1

1

W-R:

o

1956-65
2
3

0 >32
1
8-4
2
5
3
4
5

1
9

1956-65
2
3

3
1
1

1
1

Source: Preparedby the authors.
Figure3. Turnoversin the Numberof New War
Participations,1946-55 vs. 1956-65
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1965-65

COW:

1956-60

0
0 >79
1 6_

1
1

0
0 '70

1
6

8
2

1

0

1

I

1961-63

W-R:

1956-60

1
2

1961-65

SIPRI:

1956-60

2

0 '59
1 111\
2

2

3
1
1

12
1

31
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Figure 4. Turnovers in the Number of New War
Participations, 1956-60 vs. 1961-65

peace, becoming involved in fewer war participations in subsequent intervals.
Those findings generally hold up, moreover,
when the 1956-60 period is contrasted with the
1961-65 interval. The exception is the slight shift
that may be observed in the SIPRI data set. Of the
15 nations experiencing at least one SIPRI new
war participation between 1956 and 1960, 12 (80.0
percent) had fewer new war participations during
the 1961-65 period. Hence, the negative trend is
once again dominant, although to a lesser extent.
At the same time, however, the positive spatial
diffusion inequality is satisfied: The number of
nations with no new war participations between
1956 and 1960 is greater than those having none
between 1961 and 1965. In addition, 18.0 percent
(13 of 72) of those nations with no new war participations in the first interval had at least one
such event in the second period. (Although that
percentage is smaller than the comparable one obtained when the two ten-year periods were contrasted, only 9 nations made the transition from
peace to new war participations. The marked difference between the number of nations that were
initially at peace in the two SIPRI turnover tables
is at least partially accounted for by the fact that
the five-year period comparison permits an increase in the number of nations from 66 to 87.)
In summary, while negative spatial diffusion or
negative reinforcement tendencies may have influ-
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enced those nations with at least one new war participation between 1956 and 1960, a positive spatial diffusion effect may have operated on those
nations that had no new war participations between 1956 and 1960.
These simple turnover table analyses have not
demonstrated, of course, that any of the four processes actually did operate. When an expected
pattern was not observed, as in the case of positive
reinforcement, it is legitimate to conclude that the
process in question did not operate. When expectations were satisfied, however, similar categorical
statements cannot be made. Nevertheless, the application of even these simple approaches has
shown that patterns that are consistent with initial
assumptions of negative spatial diffusion, negative reinforcement, and, to a lesser extent, positive
spatial diffusion can be observed empirically.
Such demonstrations are not unimportant.
They weaken the Poisson/Modified Poisson conclusion that at least the SIPRI new war participations tended to diffuse quite readily from one nation to another, even though some evidence was
consistent with the positive spatial diffusion hypothesis. These simple analyses provide insight into an area almost completely untapped by our
preliminary studies; namely, that rather strong
negative spatial diffusion and negative reinforcement processes may have discouraged nations
from beginning new war participations.5
One other point should be made. Both the Poisson/Modified Poisson and turnover table analyses focus on possible diffusion phenomena where
such processes are the least likely to operate. The
results are therefore somewhat surprising. Both
sets of procedures yield some evidence that is
consistent with the hypothesis that the diffusion/
reinforcement processes were operating even at
the global level where the theoretical argument
predicted that the influence of those effects would
not be particularly strong.
Diffusion Among Sets of Interacting Nations.
The theoretical formulation developed above sugprocesses
gests that diffusion/reinforcement
should be most likely to operate-if indeed they
operate at all-at a group level among those nations that share high levels of interaction. As we
'At the same time, the applicationsof these turnover
tables have providedat least a partialescapefrom two
limitationsof the Poisson/ModifiedPoisson approach.
It has been shown, for example,that theseanalysescan
yield resultsthat are generallyconsistentover at least
ten- and five-yearperiodsof aggregation,and that they
can be appliedto focus on differentnumbersof nations.
Moreover,thesetests have shownthat it is at least partiallypossibleto distinguishamongthe fouralternatives
underconsideration.
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have argued, nations close to one another or sharing some common border should interact and
demonstrate high levels of mutual awareness. If
this is the case and if new war participations do actually diffuse, then it seems reasonable to expect
nations with a nation at war on their border at a
given time will have a higher propensity to become
involved in new war participations at some later
time than those nations whose bordering nations
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are initiallyat peace. In other words, one would
expectnationsto catch "the wardisease,"to borrow Alcock's (1972) phrase, if they borderon a
nation alreadystrickenwith the malaise.
As a first step towardtestingthis borderoperationalizationof the generaldiffusion argument,
we coded each nation in the internationalsystem
for the number of bordersit possessed in each
year between 1945 and 1965. While details on

Table 1. Diffusion/Reinforcement Hypotheses and Empirical Expectations
Positive Reinforcement
Expectation: The ratio between (a) the number of nations which participated in at least one war at to and
which participated in a greater number of wars at t1 than at to and (b) the number of nations which
participated in at least one war at to approaches 1.00.
Rationale: If positive reinforcement is operative, then one would expect:
That if a nation was involved in one or more wars at to, it will have been involved in even more wars at t1.
Positive Spatial Diffusion
Expectations:
a. The number of nations not participating in any war at to > the number of nations not participating at
tj;

b. The ratio between (a) the number of nations which participated in zero wars at to and which
participated in at least one war at t1 and (b) the number of nations which participated in zero wars at
to approaches 1.00; and
c. The ratio between (a) the number of nations which participated in a greater number of wars at t1 than
at to and (b) the total number of nations approaches 1.00.
Rationale: If positive spatial diffusion is operative, then one would expect:
1. That if a nation was involved in one or more wars at to, it will have been involved in even more wars at
tI;and,
2. That even if a nation was not involved in any wars at to, it could still become involved in a war at tj.
Negative Reinforcement
Expectation: The proportion between (a) the number of nations which participated in at least one war at to
and which participated in a smaller number of wars at t1 than at to and (b) the number of nations which
participated in at least one war at to approaches 1.00.
Rationale: If negative reinforcement is operative, then one would expect:
That if a nation was involved in one or more wars at to, it will have been involved in fewer wars at t1.
Negative Spatial Diffusion
Expectations:
a. The number of nations not participating in any war at to < the number of nations not participating in
a war at tj;
b. The ratio between (a) the number of nations which were not participating in any war at either to and
t1 and (b) the number of nations not participating in any war at to approaches 1.00; and
c. The ratio between (a) the number of nations which participated in at least one war at to and which
participated in a smaller number of wars at t1 than at to plus those which participated in zero wars in
both periods and (b) the number of nations approaches 1.00.
Rationale: If negative spatial diffusion is operative, then one would expect:
That whether a nation is at peace or at war at to, it will refrain from becoming involved in any (or as
many) wars at tj.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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these codings are available in Most and Starr
(1975, 1976) and Starr and Most (1976, 1978), suffice it to say that they are based on a mutually exclusive and cumulative six-way classification
scheme that taps the following types of international frontiers:
1. Non-colonial borders (those that exist directly
between two members of the international
system):
a. contiguous land borders
b. 200-mile limit water borders
c. proximity zone borders.
2. Colonial borders (those that indirectly exist between two members of the international system
as a result of colonies or territorial possessions):
a. contiguous land borders
b. 200-mile limit water borders
c. proximity zone borders.
Additional yearly codings recorded each occasion
in which any given nation shared some border
with a second nation that was involved in a war.
In this way, it was possible to calculate the total
number of warring border nations that each nation had in each year between 1946 and 1965 and
to construct simple contingency tables (see Figure
5).
Regarding the existence of a warring border nation as a "treatment" that nations either did or
did not experience in any given year, this strategy

permits a focus on the following implicit transitions:6
1. From peace to peace with no border nations at
war at to (all);
2. From peace to at least one new war participation with no border nations at war at to (a12);
3. From peace to peace with at least one warring
border nation at to (a2l); and
4. From peace to at least one new war participation with at least one warring border nation at
to (a22).
If the border operationalization of the positive
spatial diffusion hypothesis holds, then two expectations should be satisfied:

6These exploratoryanalysesfocus exclusivelyon nations that were at peace at to. Two considerationssuggest the need for such a strategy.First, if a nation is
alreadyat war, that fact is likely to influencethat nation's decisioncalculusmore stronglythan the simple
existenceof warringbordernations.Second,a focus on
those nationsthat wereat peaceat topermitsan investigation of positive spatialdiffusion in the only area in
which the expectationsfrom that hypothesisdo not
overlapwith expectationsfrom the positive reinforcement argument.Thus, a focus on those nations that
wereat peaceat any givenpoint in time servesto maximize the likelihoodthat evidenceof the warringborder
nation operationalizationof the positive spatialdiffusion hypothesiswill be isolated.

Table 2. Summary of Results Relating to the Four Diffusion/Reinforcement Hypotheses
1946-55 vs. 1956-65

1956-60 vs. 1961-65

COW

W-R

SIPRI

COW

W-R

SIPRI

% Ratio

% Ratio

% Ratio

% Ratio

% Ratio

% Ratio

Positive Reinforcement
Expectation

5.3

1/19

4.5

1/22

4.0

1/25

0.0

0/7

0.0

0/11

6.7

Positive Spatial Diffusion
Expectation (a)
Expectation (b)
Expectation (c)

No* 4.2 2/47
4.5 3/66

No
13.6
10.6

6/44
7/66

No
22.0 9/41
15.2 10/66

No
1.2
1.1

1/80
1/87

No
7.9
6.9

6/76
6/87

Yes
18.0 13/72
16.1 14/87

Negative Reinforcement
Expectation

84.2 16/19

86.4 19/22

72.0 18/25

85.7

90.9 10/11

80.0 12/15

Negative Spatial Diffusion
Expectation (a)
Expectation (b)
Expectation (c)

Yes* 95.7 45/47
92.4 61/66

Yes
86.4 38/44
86.4 57/66

Yes
78.0 32/41
75.6 50/66

Yes
98.8 79/80
97.7 85/87

Yes
92.1 70/76
92.0 80/87

No
81.9 59/72
81.6 71/87

-

6/7

Source: Prepared by the authors.
Note: Calculations are based on the expectations shown in Table 1.
*"Yes" and "No" entries denote whether or not the given expectation was or was not satisfied.
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A. Number of New War Participations t1 to ts
0
0

Number of Warring
Border Nations to

>1

COW:

a22 = .1499

WR:

G22=.1558

>1

al1

a12

2

a22

a12 = .0303

(-22)1(W12) = 4.9472;

a12=.0345
(d22)/Ga12)= 4.5159;
al2-.0589
SIPRI: a22=.1855
(d_22)/GT12)= 3.149,

B. Number of SIPRI New War Participations,
1959-63

Number of SIPRI
WarringBorder
Nations, 1958

0

>1

0

21

o

>1

45

14

Source: Prepared by the authors.
Figure 5. Contingency Table Format, with an Example
Using SIPRI Data (for All Nations at Peace at to)

a22 > a12

and
(a22)I(a12 + a22)

-p

1.00.

In Table 3, the tests for these expectations are presented for the COW, WR, and SIPRI data sets.
The first column denotes the appropriate to for
each test. The second column identifies the fiveyear period, subsequent to to, during which new
war participations were aggregated.
The results of these analyses show impressive
evidence in support of the border operationalization of the positive spatial diffusion hypothesis.
In the 43 five-year lags examined (15 each in COW
and SIPRI; 13 in WR), the inequality is not satisfied only twice. Overwhelmingly, for all three
data sets, a22 > a12.In the same number of tests,
the ratio dropped below .50 on only four occasions. (Of the two expectations delineated above,
the ratio test is more likely not to be satisfied. The
majority of the nations were always at peace.
Hence, the implicit transition from peace to at
least one new war participation under the condition of 0 warring border nations could carry a low
probability and still cause a number of nations to
make that shift.)
Perhaps the most useful summary of the test results, however, are the following comparisons of
the mean transition rates:

where the COW a22denotes the mean a22obtained
in the 15 five-year lag tests shown in Table 3, and
so on.
Even though a nation has at least one warring
border nation at some point in time, it should be
evident that that nation will not necessarily participate in at least one conflict during the subsequent five-year period. Like lung cancer, wars are
rare events. Nevertheless, just as in the relationship between smoking and cancer, having a warring border nation does increase the odds that a
subsequent new war participation will occur
within five years. On the SIPRI data set, those
chances are increased over three times; on the WR
data set, four and a half times; and on the COW
data set, nearly five times.
We have again asked the question: What would
the world "look like" if there were positive spatial
diffusion? This question could best be answered
by focusing on a group of nations that could not
also be involved in positive reinforcement, those
nations that had not been at war at some given
time. These nations were submitted to a "treatment" -the presence or absence of warring border nations. The possible effects of this treatment
are apparent. The presence of warring border nations may have increased a peaceful nation's probability of going to war from three to five times.

Conclusion
The empirical findings may be readily summarized under the procedures used in this and our
earlier analyses:

The Poisson/ModifiedPoissonApproach:The application and subsequent testing of the Poisson
and Modified Poisson models yielded no evidence
that COW new war participations diffused from
one nation to another between 1946 and 1965.
When identical procedures were applied to the
SIPRI new war participations, however, exactly
the opposite findings were obtained: SIPRI new
war participations apparently did diffuse from
one nation to another during the 20-year period.
Tests on the WR data failed to yield clear conclusions that diffusion processes were or were not
operating.
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Table 3. Tests of the Positive Spatial Diffusion/Warring Border Nation Hypothesis:
Subsequent New War Participations for All Nations at Peace at Each Successive to
Row Variable
(to)

Colujnn Variable
(t1 tots)

al2

a22

Ratio:
a22/a12 +a22

A. Results Based on COW Data
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960

1947-51
1948-52
1949-53
1950-54
1951-55
1952-56
1953-57
1954-58
1955-59
1956-60
1957-61
1958-62
1959-63
1960-64
1961-65

1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958

1947-51
1948-52
1949-53
1950-54
1951-55
1952-56
1953-57
1954-58
1955-59
1956-60
1957-61
1958-62
1959-63

.000
.128
.083
.103
.000
.000
.000
.000
.052
.063
.000
.000
.000
.000
.025

.364
.500
.393
.343
.098
.082
.078
.077
.130
.105
.000
.027
.026
.026
.000

100.0
72.2
78.6
73.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
50.0
33.3
0.0*
100.0
100.0
100.0
0.0*

.313
.292
.196
.231
.020
.098
.094
.096
.128
.158
.118
.170
.185

93.8
100.0
90.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
62.5
66.7
100.0
81.8
38.5

.300
.209
.163
.217
.061
.167
.170
.200
.172
.180
.123
.172
.237
.186
.226

80.0
100.0
87.5
90.9
75.0
88.9
100.0
90.9
90.9
91.7
100.0
90.9
100.0
100.0
93.3

B. Results Based on WR Data
.083
.000
.091
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.077
.071
.000
.065
.131
C. Results Based on SIPRI Data
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960

1947-51
1948-52
1949-53
1950-54
1951-55
1952-56
1953-57
1954-58
1955-59
1956-60
1957-61
1958-62
1959-63
1960-64
1961-65

.176
.000
.100
.100
.100
.091
.000
.083
.063
.059
.000
.045
.000
.000
.067

Source: Prepared by the authors.
*Zero New War Participations occurred in the lagged period. Such occurrences omitted from the error totals.
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The TurnoverTableAnalyses:The turnovertables
indicatedthat strongnegativereinforcementand!
or negativespatial diffusion processesmay have
influencedthe subsequentwar behaviorof those
nationsthat experiencedat least one new warparticipation during the initial period. Although
those tendenciesdominatedthe resultsin all three
data sets, they werestrongestin the COWset and
weakestin the SIPRIdata. Some evidenceto support the hypothesisof positive spatial diffusion
was also isolated. Although it was weak in comparison with the above-mentionednegative effects, the strengthof the positivespatialdiffusion
appearedto increaseas one movedfromthe COW
to the WR to the SIPRIdata sets. No evidenceof
positive reinforcementwas found in any of the
analyses.

tions within which diffusion processes might
operate.
In lieu of such additional work, however, our
argument is generally supported by the existing results. War participations during the 1946-65 period do indeed seem to have altered nations' levels
of uncertainty and their zones of unconditional
and conditional viability. Much like arms races,
wars appear to have caused leaders to reassess the
situations confronting them. The evidence is consistent with the proposition that conlicts at one
point in time affect leaders' decisions to participate in or refrain from subsequent wars. The evidence is weakest in the global-level stochastic
modeling analyses; as predicted, it is most apparent in the examination of diffusion processes
among groups of bordering nations. With only
one exception, however, the analyses yield results
that are consistent with the argument. The occurrence of a new war participation by one nation
The ContingencyTable Analysesof the Warring during the 1946-65 period did alter the probability
BorderNation Operationalization
of the Positive that: (a) that same nation would experience subseSpatial Diffusion Hypothesis:These procedures quent new war participations, and (b) other nayieldedverystrongevidencein supportof the war- tions would experience subsequent new war parring border nation/positive spatial diffusion hy- ticipations.

pothesis. While having a warringborder nation
clearlydid not mean that a nation would necessarily have at least one new war participationin
the subsequentfive-yearperiod, it certainlyincreasedthe probabilitiesthat subsequentnew war
participationswould occur. If the numbersof occasions in which the expectationswere not satisfied were used as an index, those results were
strongeston the SIPRI data and weakestin the
COW set. However, calculationand comparison
of mean transitionrates indicatedthat having a
warring border nation increases the likelihood
that a subsequentnew war participationwould
occuroverthreetimeson the SIPRIset and nearly
fived timeson the COWdata.
Clearly,furthereffort is requiredto synthesize
these findings. Different types of wars appearto
have differentpropensitiesto diffuse, but further
explorationof this problemwill requirethe development of new data sets that make more precise
distinctionsbetween large- and small-scaleconflicts. It will be necessaryto probewhetheror not
differenttypes of borderstend to drivediffusion
processesand whether or not major and minor
power nations tend to react in similar ways to
warson their frontiers.It will be importantto investigate whether warring border nations have
varyingimpactson nations that are themselvesat
peace and war. Finally, it may be of interestto
consider other, non-border-relatedoperationalizationsof the generaltheoreticalargumentwitha
view towardexploringwhetherfactorssuch as alliancepartnerships,tradingunions, and linguistic
affinitiesmightalso define sets of interactingna-
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